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International
Relations-PSC 201
VU
LESSON
16
NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
How
NIEO Could Be Achieved?
A
NIEO would require revised terms of
trade and removal of agricultural
subsidies and technology
transfer
from
the developed to the developing world.
Development aid, which is
not `tied' or motivated by
political
interests,
could also help achieve
economic development in poor
countries.
Greater
decision-making power in International Financial
Institutions (World Bank, Asian
Development
Bank
and the International Monetary
Fund) and the World Trade Organization
could also help
promote
more
equitable development.
NIEO
& the Islamic
World
The
Muslim world comprising of over a
billion people and with
impressive energy reserves
like oil supplies,
still
faces crippling levels of
poverty and increasing
disparities. It could thus have
much to gain from the
NIEO.
The
population, resources and
institutions (SAARC, ECO and
OIC) of the Muslim world
could also make
it
an effective advocate for the egalitarian
approach espoused by
NIEO.
NIEO
Constraints and Challenges
NIEO
does not pay sufficient
attention to environmental concerns.
This focus on the environment is
vital
since
growth that ignores
environmental costs is not
sustainable.
Achieving
NIEO requires real shifts of power
and privileges in the world order,
which will have
serious
political
implications. It must be kept in mind
however, that economic development does
not necessarily
guarantee
for human development.
What
the Third World, or at least the
driving element among the nonaligned,
meant by a new
international
order
was very different. Revision of the
international division of labor along the
lines described was
intended
to accompany and implement the
establishment of a self-reliant industrial
national economy.
The
strengthening of the national state and
the active role of state
policy were, in this strategy, to
ensure
that
industry was not made up of
discrete fragments, but of
every stage of the production
process. The
resort
to importation of the ingredients of
these production lines (the
purchase of turnkey factories)
entailed
a
high level of exports, whether of
'traditional' raw materials or
new industrial products. Hence the
success
of
the strategies was largely
dependent on the capacity to win
concessions, which was in
turn the program
for
the new international economic
order.
The
conflict of these two 'interpretations'
of the new order has
appeared in all the negotiations on
the
industrial
international division of labor
and relocation. The points of
discussion were the character
and
options
of establishment, the degree of
decentralized decision-making, and the
methods of financing the
transfers,
issues of personnel training
and management, and access
to external markets. The Third
World
states
generally pressed for: the
establishment of as complete industries
as possible, with upstream
and
downstream
links, agreed rules subjecting the
management of industrial units to the
state's industrial
policy,
an
option for management of units by
local staff, access to international
distribution networks for
manufactured
goods to localized firms (as the
lowering of protectionist barriers by the
developed countries
was
not regarded as a sufficient
guarantee of access to these
markets), support for national
technological
research,
regulated financing (to
avoid, for example, a
subsidiary of a multinational financing
its investment
by
calling on local banking sources
without bringing in new
capital), regulation of transfers (a
sharing of
risks,
ceilings on exportable profits, obligations to invest
part of the profit in the national
economy) and so
on.
These
demands were regarded as
unacceptable by the multinationals whose
sole interest was in
partial
relocation
through subsidiaries under their
virtual control.
International
Relations-PSC 201
VU
Gradually,
most of the Third World
states have had to come to
terms with the redeployment strategy.
The
only
states in a position to negotiate
are those that refuse the
direct establishment of subsidiaries and
seek
an
alternative in the purchase of turnkey
factories within the framework of their
overall industrialization
policy.
The
strategy of these states counted on the
possibility of successful change of the
international order
through
unilateral joint action, and through
further action from North-South
collective negotiations. The
idea,
it should be remembered, was to organize
cartels of Third World
producers who could insist on
price
revisions
for raw materials. National
control over natural resources should
allow scope for negotiation
not
only
on supply, but also and
above all on exploitation of the
resources that took into
account long-term
national
interests and halted the rates of
exploitation governed entirely by the
needs of the developed world.
With
this new-found strength, the Third
World countries hoped to enjoy a genuine
negotiating power that
would
oblige the North to make
concessions: for instance,
access to its markets, a
code of conduct for
transfers
of technology. Co-operation between Third
World countries ('collective
self-reliance') was part
of
this
bid for strength.
This
is the essential context for
discussing the use of oil
surpluses. On some views the NIEO
was to be no
more
than the rise in oil prices
alone and the relocation of export
industry a minor operation. On this
view
the
oil revenue surpluses should be
made available to the developed financial
markets to supply their
own
policies
of intervention in relations between developed
countries, and marginal
support for the 'survival' of
the
old international division of
labor in the developing countries. This
rescued the attitude of 'aid' as a
permanent
safety-valve ensuring the perpetuation of a
system that was increasingly
unjust day by day.
The
actual
use of oil surpluses has in
fact served this
purpose.
In
the mid-1970s there was
still the hope that the Third
World would reject this narrow
view. The non-
aligned
movement and the group of 77 were
seeking a strategy for collective battle
for across the board
increases
in raw materials prices, as the
resolution on the solidarity fund and
producers associations taken
at
Dakar
in February 1977 showed.
This strong and valid
approach was not sustained.
Under the pressure of
the
developed countries and the bias of
UNCTAD and endless
'negotiation' and 'dialogue', the
'stabilization'
fund
strategy replaced that of
producers associations for collective
unilateral intervention where such
was
required.
Economic
Possibilities for the
Future
The
divide between the rich and
the poor will continue to
increase given the current patterns of
economic
growth
seen around the world. The
limits of growth will also
catch up to spread more
impoverishment
around
the world.
There
needs to a basic change of
values and corresponding structural
changes, which can ensure
that
growth
proves more beneficial for all,
not those who are
already rich.
Prerequisites
for the NIEO
Political
Development: need
for good governance is imperative
for economic growth, efficiency
and
redistribution
Equitable
Economic Development: growth
without increasing internal
disparities is much harder to
achieve
Social
Development: meet
basic human needs and
provide opportunity to all to
realize latent potential
Environmental
Sustainability: growth
in a manner rate and at a
pace which does not
harm the natural
environment
Relevant
Vocabulary
Latent:
hidden, undeveloped
or dormant
Disparities:
differences
Egalitarian:
equal,
open, democratic
International
Relations-PSC 201
VU
Surplus:
extra
or in excess
Suggested
Readings
Students
are advised to read the
following chapters to develop a better understanding
of the various
principals
highlighted in this hand-out:
Chapter
9 in `"A Study of International
Relations" by Dr. Sultan
Khan.
Internet
Resources
In
addition to reading from the
textbook, please visit the
following web-pages for this
lecture, which
provide
useful and interesting
information:
The
Struggle for the NIEO
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu32me/uu32me06.htm
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