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Globalization
of Media MCM404
VU
Lesson
21
MEDIA
AS ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
Text
of two handouts for
students
Note:
While the title of the lecture
focuses on the role of media as
elements of national power, it is
relevant
for
students to review aspects of national
security in the conventional sense of the
term as well as the
unconventional
sense. Thus, in this handout, it will be
found that emphasis is given to
even "invisible"
frontiers
and boundaries because such
elements have a powerful and
motivating impact on the capacity
and
ability
of a people to defend themselves against external
threats as well as to be able to
cope with internal
threats.
The text of the handout was
originally prepared in 1998
but, except for a nominal
topicality of a few
aspects,
the principal observations remain, in the
opinion of the lecturer, valid and
relevant for students in
2005
and for several years to
come.
This
handout reproduces a chapter
from the book titled: "Storms
and rainbows" by Javed
Jabbar published
by
Summit Media and Royal
Book Company, 2001, e-mail:
royalbook@hotmail.com.
The
invisible frontiers of national
security
While
I propose to deal with the
invisible frontiers of national
security, let us first
identify the visible
frontiers.
First and foremost are the people of
our country, wherever they
may live and work. It is the
desire
of
our people, their will and
their determination to be Pakistanis
and to remain part of our
country that makes
them
the most obvious, and the most
powerful visible frontier. Other visible
frontiers comprise a range
of
indicators
such as those listed
below.
Boundary
lines that demarcate the country's
territory on maps reflecting the general
acceptance by the world
of
these lines as the political,
sovereign frontiers of a State.
Border posts, including airports, sea
ports, railway
stations
and road check-points that
mark entry and exit
points of territory.
Military
defence capacity, as expressed
through the Armed Forces on land, sea
and in the air to enforce
the
visible
lines of security.
Economic
infrastructure and the productive
capacity of a country: our industry,
agriculture, services,
transportation,
telecommunications and other
sub-sectors. Geographical features that
help define a country's
territory
and give some States extra-ordinary
dimensions of security. For
example, the world's largest
island,
Australia
has a degree of permanent natural
protection due to the water by
which it is surrounded and by
its
own
huge size. In the age of
missiles and sophisticated
aerial warfare, such
geographical features have
also
become
vulnerable but geographic identity
remains a tangible, visible
frontier.
General
stability, as in the absence of an
organized, sustained, armed
internal rebellion against the
State, there
may
be insurgencies as sustained as the Naxalites
over three to four decades
in parts of India such as in
Bihar
and
in Andhra Pradesh but the movement
remains confined and is not
wide-spread throughout India.
There
certainly
are several other internal
rebellions in India but, taken together,
they have not yet reached
critical
mass.
Fortunately
for us in Pakistan, while illegal
arms and weapons have
proliferated widely and while
certain
groups
indulge in systematic violence, we continue to possess
an overall and general
stability. In an age of
electronic
technology and new military
instruments for dominance
and control, the conventional
notions of
national
sovereignty and the conventional
concept of visible frontiers of national
security are unreliable
indicators.
While
possessing almost all the visible
frontiers, a State may not
have national security.
Perhaps the classical
example
is what happened to the Soviet Union in
1991. Reference to conventional
assumptions about visible
frontiers
and national security brings
to my mind the image of a State
that is like the ship
Titanic which, in
this
case, hits the iceberg of its
own phantoms and its
false sense of security,
only to disintegrate and
sink.
The
"nomenclatura" dimension of the Soviet
Union by which the ruling elite enjoyed
special privileges but
at
the
same time insulated itself
from reality is a lesson to be always
remembered.
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In
contrast, we have the unique wisdom of
China which abandoned the inefficiency of
economic
communism
but retained the strong centralized
authority of political communism in
order to ensure the
stability
and coherence of the Chinese
State. Whereas Mikhail Gorbachev
attempted to simultaneously
abandon
both economic and political
communism as a result of which the Soviet
State disintegrated.
While
retaining political communism and
its State security, China
has proceeded to deregulate in
the
economic
sphere to achieve the world's highest
growth rate and to deepen
its economic
security.
In
the case of Pakistan, we have a
strong military sector and
yet very weak law and
order, representing a
remarkable
juxta-position of contrasting conditions. There is a
serious threat to our external national
security
from
India and serious threats
also to our internal
security due to our own
failures and fears.
Our
conventional military forces
and technology are being out-paced by a
hostile neighbour which is
investing
heavily in aggressive weapons. Our
physical infra-structure, a facet of
national security, is
functioning.
Planes take off and land,
the trains run (despite
bombs and bloodshed), the road traffic
flows.
But
our spiritual infra-structure has
serious malfunctions. It is often jammed:
it is also crumbling, like many
of
our
roads and urban sewerage
systems. When we turn to
identifying the invisible frontiers of
national security,
we
can demarcate three such
frontiers that manifest
themselves with visible
features.
The
first of these invisible
frontiers are the spiritual frontiers,
predominantly inspired by, and
based upon, our
religious
faith in Islam. Yet, for an
aspect that is common to the overwhelming
majority of our people,
it
appears
that our spiritual frontiers
have been taken over by a
small minority of
people.
We
have four broad categories of
adherents to Islam in Pakistan. We have
the small minority of
extremists,
comprising
fanatics who will not
tolerate any alternate viewpoint.
Most of these are also very
sectarian-
minded
and prone to violence in direct
contradiction to the edicts of Islam
which enjoin tolerance and
peace
in
the matter of religious faith and
observance.
There
is the second category which
could be called the orthodox
segment of our society, people
who are
conservative
without being extremist or violent. There
is then the third stream
that can be described as
the
moderate
majority, representing most of
our people, best personified by the urban
middle class but also
by
the
majority of rural households
that may seem to be orthodox
and conservative by tradition,
but who, in
practice,
are balanced and
open-minded.
Lastly,
there is the segment of our
society that should be called
unchangingly Muslim in their beliefs
and yet
at
the same time, inconsistent and
irregular, or self contradictory in their
actual practice of the injunctions
of
our
faith. Even while one
arbitrarily divides fellow Muslims into
these four broad streams,
one remains
conscious
that in some respects there
are over-laps and
commonalities. There is a criss-cross
nature to the
spiritual
frontiers which is an inevitable
consequence of our being a State derived
from the fact that most
of
our
people share the same religious identity.
The other such State,
Israel, also contains
sharply varying
interpretations
of Judaism so we need not feel
unduly alarmed at our
condition!
It
is notable that, despite certain deep
schisms we have a strong
sense of being Pakistani; we do not want
to
loose
this "Pakistaniat" even though we
may disagree on critical issues.
Regrettably, for a country with
such a
strong
Muslim frontier of national
security, some of us tend to
regard non-Muslim Pakistanis,
specially those
of
the Hindu faith, as being less
Pakistani than others. This
kind of suspicion or disregardful
attitude is
contrary
to the spirit of Islam and to the principles
advocated by the Quaid-e-Azam.
Though
we are an overwhelmingly Muslim
nation, we do not, as a State,
practice the true values of Islam.
For
example,
less than 1 per cent of
national income is distributed
formally and officially to the
poor and the
dispossessed
whereas some non-Muslim
countries like Sweden spend
about 37% of their national
income on
social
welfare.
The
second set of invisible
frontiers could be described as
psychological frontiers or psycho-social
frontiers.
We
notice the curious contrast between the
strong sense of Pakistaniat, to which I
have referred earlier, with
the
weak sense of duty to the
State and of taking pride in
the State.
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We
have secured some
substantive achievements in 50 years
and are proud to be
Pakistanis. Yet we have
an
incessant
tendency to invalidate ourselves and to
revel in gloom. Some of this moroseness is
justified because
of
our illiteracy, weak law
enforcement, delayed justice,
inefficiency and corruption. But
our low self-esteem
becomes
particularly painful when the green
Pakistani passport is viewed with
suspicion at overseas airports
because
we find other people also
viewing us with the same
lens that we do.
The
tendency to migrate, to leave
behind the despair in our
own lands in order to gain
fulfilment in other
lands,
also reflects growing
disparities between the rich
and the poor. So we Pakistanis
help to rejuvenate
Canada
even as we weaken Pakistan! There should
be a migration tax imposed on recipient
countries
particularly
the countries of North America and
Europe because the highly skilled or
well-educated
professionals
who migrate there do not
even remit the major part of
their income to Pakistan,
unlike the
lower
income, temporary migrant workers who go
to the Gulf and the Middle-Eastern
countries.
There
is a serious haemohorrage of human
resources that is presently
taking place, sapping and
draining us,
eroding
a vital frontier of our
security. The third set of
invisible frontiers is our communication
frontiers. On
the
one hand, these have
developed fairly actively and widely
within our own country. In
spite of the fact that
only
about three million households
out of about twenty million
households in the country have
access to
telephone
lines or to a close-by fax
service, there has been a
rapid expansion of access to
telecommunication
in
recent years.
However,
in a comprehensive context, we have media
scarcity and media poverty,
best evident in our
low
literacy.
In another dimension, even within our
own territory, and even in
the mass medium of radio
that has
the
highest level of coverage, it is
regrettable that in the border
areas of our country, the
radio and
propaganda
signals from India are
far more powerful and
clear than the broadcasts
from Radio Pakistan.
Some
countries such as an economic
super-power like Japan can
afford to have weak external
communication
frontiers
and yet remain economic
Titans. But we cannot afford to do so.
Overseas media have a
strong
presence
inside Pakistan, and not
just in our border areas.
For example, video-tapes of
Indian movies as well
as
a proliferation of Indian satellite TV
channels, film songs and
audio-tapes, photographs of Indian film
stars
on
posters and in newspapers, as
well as non-Indian radio and
TV channels such as BBC, CNN
and others
are
widely viewed.
It
is ironic that there is very
little media in-put into
Pakistan from those very
countries with whom we
have
strong
religious affinity, countries such as
Iran, Turkey, the Gulf and
the Middle-East. We have more
media
in-put
from our most hostile
neighbour as well as from
countries and regions far
away from us such as
the
USA
and Europe, than we do from
countries that are fellow
Muslim brethren!
Out
of, let us say, 1000
kilometres of our communication frontiers,
only about 200 kilometres are
strong and
stable
whereas 800 kilometres are
weak and are breached
daily. When we consider the
way forward to the
future,
we should attach the highest priority to
reducing disharmony and
discordance between the visible
and
in
the invisible frontiers of national
security. We need to learn
how to be truly Muslim by ending
our habit of
trying
to convert the 95 per cent of
our population who are
already Muslim into being Muslims
all over again.
This
excessive zeal to be holier
than thou is totally
misplaced and irrelevant.
I
am confident that, contrary to the grim predictions of
some analysts in Pakistan
and in Washington D.C.,
the
Balkanization of Pakistan will not
happen. Let us recognize
that the uncertainty factor is
deliberately
promoted
by those hostile to Pakistan and it is
inadvertently given credence by those
Pakistanis who allow
the
pains of our evolution to be
mistaken as the death-knell of our
existence.
We
need to study in-depth the
remarkable tenacity of nations such as
Eritrea rather than only
concentrate on
the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the Czech Republic. Education
must be our guiding force
for
cementing
our invisible frontiers. To
bring about a fundamental re-orientation
we need political
commandoes,
individuals with extraordinary grit
and integrity to secure our
political frontiers. We also
need
to
right size and re-structure
our Armed forces in
consonance with new technology
and our economic
priorities
without reducing our
capacity to deter external
threats.
But
the emergence of new technology needs to
be seen with caution and
realism because the
more
sophisticated
the new technologies, the more
expensive they become! We cannot afford
indulgence in high-
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cost
gadgetries because of our
burden of debt and debt servicing. One
critical factor in deepening
our
national
security will be to make
service in the Armed Forces
compulsory for two years
for all males
aged
between
18 years to 40 years, while
using flexible age segments
for females in view of their
special needs as
mothers
and home-makers.
In
the media sector, we need to
strengthen our defences by
opening up the air waves of the country
to allow
a
million voices to speak, rather
than let only the existing
State monopolies to continue.
Most
importantly, we must empower
our women because it is only
with their full-fledged
participation as
citizens
able to exercise all their
human and legal rights that
we can over-come the negative
gender ratio and
injustice
that exists in
Pakistan.
Note:
As the
context of this lecture has a direct
relationship with aspects of national
security, in addition to
referring
to the verbal content of the lecture and
the PPTs, students are
invited to review the text given
below
titled:
"Directions of national security" which
represents a chapter from the
book: "Storms and Rainbows" by
Javed
Jabbar published by Summit Media
and Royal Book Company,
BG-5, Rex Centre, Zebunnissa
Street,
Karachi
74400, Tel: 5684244,
5653418, e-mail: royalbook@hotmail.com.
Directions
of National Security
Over
the years since the Pakistan-India war of
September 1965 (September,
1998), the security dimension
for
Pakistan
has been marked by a mixture
of stagnation, erosion and renewal.
On the edge of a new
millennium,
the multi-layered and inter-woven nature
of the perspectives for our
national security are
further
reinforced
by the acquisition of a formal nuclear power
status in May 1998
accompanied by an unprecedented
economic
crisis and an assault upon
the Federative principle that binds the 4
provinces together.
The
stagnation of our security situation is
directly related to the continuing state
of hostility with India
shaped
pre-dominantly,
but not exclusively, by the
unresolved aspect of the Kashmir issue.
Through all the
vicissitudes
of events in both countries
and in Kashmir and through
all the sweeping changes in
the
international
arena, the problem of Kashmir has
continued to simmer and
crackle. It has shaped
our
perception
of the major threat to our country and
has consequently determined our
investment in the Armed
Forces.
Thus, in the era in which the
Berlin Wall was dismantled
and communism in general and
western
communism
in particular collapsed, bringing
large-scale geo-political change
across an entire continent,
Kashmir
in that very year, 1989, re-erupted as if
to remind the world that in this
issue there exists a depth
and
complexity
that goes even beyond the
stark division between
single-party communist ideology
and the multi-
party
free market
philosophy.
A
second aspect of the stagnant
nature of our security situation in
respect of India is that, even
apart from
Kashmir,
assuming for a moment that the
issue is resolved and is no longer the
source of tension, Pakistan
cannot
afford to lower its guard as
long as India relentlessly
pursues an expansion of its
armed forces entirely
at
variance with its claims to
peace and non-violence. As the only
country in South Asia that
has
continuously
enlarged its own territory
since independence in 1947
(Junagadh, Manawadh, Sikkim, Hyderabad
Deccan,
Kashmir and Goa) the Indian
pursuit of a hegemonistic role
may be a self-deluding and
grandiose
ambition
but it is an extrapolation of its
track record of the past 50
years. Thus, in the foreseeable
future,
stagnation,
in as much of a positive sense
that stagnation can be seen,
will remain a feature of our
national
security
situation.
With
the disastrous political and
military decisions taken in
1971 there occurred the most
serious erosion of
our
national security. The loss
of East Pakistan was a
profound tragedy for the very
concept of Pakistan,
shaking
to the very foundation the spiritual and
psychological well-springs of national
origin and national
identity.
Of almost equal magnitude
was the geo-strategic change at
our expense, in South Asia.
The scale
and
consequences of that loss
have obscured and distorted the reality
of the circumstances in which the
set-
back
occurred. Whereas Pakistan's
military forces on the land, on the sea
and in the air were never
deployed
at
optimal levels to defend East
Pakistan, the loss was seen
as a defeat inflicted upon
almost equal
adversaries.
In
actual fact, of the 90,000 people
taken as prisoners-of-war by the Indian
forces, less than 50,000
personnel
belonged
to the armed forces. The
forces were asked to fight
in some of the most unfavourable
conditions,
about
1,000 land miles away from
their supply ports, separated by a much
larger hostile neighbour
and
eventually
encircled by its forces,
with an alienated civil
population as a finishing touch to this
doomed
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scenario.
The Indian "victory" in East
Pakistan in December 1971
was more a lopsided push-over, a win
by
default
and nowhere close to a result of a
conflict in which both
adversaries used all the
resources at their
command.
Be
that as it may, the drastic
erosion that occurred in
December 1971 was gradually
compensated for by three
measures.
First: an attempt to see the post-1971 form of
Pakistan as a more rational
and viable nation-state
that
sustained the wisdom and
truth of the two-nation theory on a
more pragmatic geo-political basis
than the
original
version itself. Second: the adoption of the
Simla Pact in 1972 between
the two adversaries
which
enabled
the release of 90,000 prisoners-of-war, the
return of Indian-occupied territory in
the western wing
and
deliberately or inadvertently, put the Kashmir
issue on the back-burner for some
years. Third: the
commencement
in 1974 of the attempt to develop nuclear
weapon capacity and its
eventual completion
about
a
decade later giving the country a
new sense of security, veiled under
ambiguity.
However,
the persistence of Indian military
expansion and its
superiority in conventional forces
means that
erosion,
like stagnation, is an almost
permanent condition. It would be
neither wise nor practical
for Pakistan
to
pursue parity and
equivalence with India in
arms capacity. The most
appropriate and effective option
for
us
is to strengthen our deterrence
capacity both on the nuclear
weapon level and in conventional
forces.
When
and if both nations sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the
nuclear
weapon dimension will also
change the balance between the
two nations to a new level of
mutual
tolerance.
Pending that occurrence we
shall have to deal with the
phenomenon that can best be
described as
"abiding
erosion." The only fitting
and effective response to the perception of
abiding erosion will be
for
Pakistan
to build a new internal
cohesion, a fortress of the spirit
and the mind that no armour
can penetrate.
This
will require an extraordinary vision in
political leadership coupled with the
organizational capability to
implement
the vision.
In
contrast to the grim history of
stagnation and erosion of
national security since
1965, the decision to
become
a formal nuclear weapon power in
May 1998, regardless of whether it
was a judicious action in terms
of
the economic fall-out and
international sanctions, was a
decisive step forward in renewing
and
strengthening
the security situation of Pakistan.
Though India retains a distinct
edge in conventional
forces
and
in all other resources, the demonstration
of nuclear weapon capacity
has a symbolic significance in
two
respects.
In unambiguous and categorical
terms, Pakistan has asserted
the only power which the psyche
of
the
Indian hegemonistic mind-set
understands and respects.
Secondly, the nuclear tests embodied
the
principle
that a relatively smaller state
can deter a much larger
adversary from hostile actions by
any one, or
all,
elements such as: support
from a rich and powerful
friend vis--vis the U.S.A.
and Israel; Eritrea's
successful
struggle against Ethiopia
and its eventual
independence; the cultivation of a
militaristic posture at
the
expense of all domestic
economic and social
considerations as in the case of North
Korea. Pakistan does
not
exclusively belong in any one of
these three categories. But
the renewal and the strengthening of
the
security
situation in May 1998
derives a little from each
of the above three categories,
even though we remain
far
removed from the benefits that Israel
enjoys and we have little of
the remarkable character shown
in
Eritrea,
nor to be fair to ourselves,
have we been as insulated
and paranoiac as North
Korea.
To
the credit of the Armed Forces of
Pakistan, particularly in the ten years
between 1988 and 1998,
our
vigilance
and combat readiness have
received undivided professional
attention undistracted by direct
involvement
in political management as occurred
during the tenure of General Zia-ul-Haq.
While the Army
leadership's
close proximity to political
affairs continues due to the
weaknesses of insecure civilian
political
leadership,
the present Chief of Army Staff, General
Jehangir Karamat who is also
the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs
of Staff Committee has, in particular, set a notable
example of focusing exclusively on the
security
responsibilities
of the Armed Forces. In spite of being
asked to be present during
some of the discussions
that
occurred in the confrontation between the
Nawaz Sharif Government and the
Supreme Court in
August-
November
1997 leading to the eventual resignation or removal of
President Leghari from the Presidency,
the
present
Chief of Army Staff has maintained a
remarkably non-partisan and entirely
professional posture in
contrast
to some of his
predecessors.
Quite
separately from the factor of
nuclear weapon deterrence, the
strength and courage of our
Armed
Forces,
notwithstanding the inequality with
India, are potent
disincentives for our
neighbour. India knows
that
it will have to pay too
heavy a price even in
conventional terms if it attempts an
all-out conflict
against
Pakistan.
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Yet
the renewal of the security situation
post-May 1998 has become a
curious mixture of effective
external
deterrence
and at the same time an ineffective
internal factor. Grave
misjudgements in economic
policy
accompanied
by a failure to improve governance,
rounded off by a callous insensitivity to
the sentiments and
views
of the three smaller provinces
have created an entirely new
condition of internal turmoil
and
uncertainty
that offsets and dilutes the
aims achieved in May
1998.
In
the context of domestic social,
economic and political
realities, in the light of the need to
redress
fundamental
inequities and injustices that
abide in our system and in
the face of new technologies
that are
shaping
and changing perspectives of
military capability, we need to initiate
a vigorous debate on how we
should
construct the framework of national
security in the new century.
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