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Globalization
of Media MCM404
VU
Lesson
13
THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND INTEREST
GROUPS
Text
of the handout for
students
Note:
This handout contains the text of a
chapter of the same name
written by the lecturer and
published
in
"From Chaos to Catharsis" by
Javed Jabbar published by Royal
Book Company (1996), BG-5,
Rex Centre,
Zebunnissa
Street, Karachi 74400, Tel:
5684244, 5653418, e-mail: royalbook@hotmail.com.
The
legislative process and
interest groups
If
the legislature itself is seen as the
supreme national interest
group representing the totality of a
country's
perceptions
about itself, then there may be the
tendency to assume that all
sectoral interest groups are
more
or
less adequately represented
within the legislature and that,
therefore, any extra role
that interest groups
want
to play in the legislative process is
really a "vested interest "group role,
self-serving rather than being
nationally
oriented.
This
is an incorrect assumption. Because even
though a fairly elected
legislature is a fairly accurate
cross-
section
of a country the method of election (i.e.
first past-the-post as distinct
from proportional
representation),
the socio-economic profile of successful
candidates, the size of political
parties and groups in
the
legislatures and other
factors may prevent all
principal segments of public
opinion as well as of the
public
interest
from being adequately represented in the
Houses.
Interest
groups therefore, have a valid
and legitimate role to play in society
and in the legislative
process
provided,
of course, that they observe
norms and parameters of conduct. This
does not always happen
but
such
aberration does not in itself invalidate
the role of interest
groups.
This
general principle stated, it is
necessary to determine the precise
interest of an interest group
before
proceeding
further. Where an interest
group's stated motivation
and objectives are in harmony
with a
country's
security and progress, where
the interest group aims to
improve public policy
whereby a larger
national
good is achieved while also
satisfying the more limited
good of the group, it is possible to
accept the
aims
and objectives of interest
groups.
At
the same time, while having constructive
national aims, an interest group,
out of uncertainty of success or
out
of sheer temptation for
short-cuts may use methods
that are dubious, illegal or corruptive.
This is the
case
of the means certainly not justifying the
ends. And it is here that
special vigilance is required to
monitor
the
methods used by interest
groups to advance their own
aims.
Where
interest groups use methods
that are above board, then
obviously they deserve study
and observation.
Interest
groups can represent a wide variety of
sectors; different categories of
industry such as textiles
(within
which
there can be sub-categories
such as yarn, wool,
ready-mades, linen, cloth,
synthetics, etc.)
chemicals,
food,
beverages; different facets of
agriculture such as cotton growers,
rice farmers, wheat farmers,
sugarcane
cultivators;
different types of traders
dealing in imports and
exports, financial institutions including
banks, co-
operatives,
white collar workers, blue-collar
workers; academics; consumer
groups; professional
associations;
voluntary
organizations; social issues
and national issues-oriented
groups on family planning,
education,
welfare,
health, environment, etc.
Some
of these interest groups,
perhaps a few, are always
well-represented in the legislatures. For
example,
agriculturists
in rural-oriented countries;
industrialists, people with significant financial
power, etc. In these
cases,
such interest groups are
also well-represented in the highest
levels of the executive leadership of
the
government
and often of the State. This
fortuitously reduces the work-load of
interest groups because
the
legislative
majority and the government do their
job for them! For
those interest groups that
are either
under-represented
in the legislatures or not represented at
all, there is a distinct and considerable
work-load.
It
is relevant to note that, due to a variety of
factors such as an inherited,
transplanted parliamentary or
legislative
system, the economic and
social structures of a nation, the
majority of peoples in South
Asian
nations
are not represented in
legislatures by individuals who
share their socio-economic
profile. In other
words,
a constituency of very poor peasants in
the rural areas or an urban constituency
of middle class or
low-income
workers may well be
represented by individuals of very high
income and of a very
different
socio-economic
profile.
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Globalization
of Media MCM404
VU
Thus,
a major interest group, i.e. the poor,
while going through the delusion that
they are duly organized as
an
interest
group through the political party or
movement that they support may, in
real terms, be deprived of
representation
inside legislatures as well as deprived
of interest groups outside
legislatures because a
political
party
led by individuals who masquerade as
champions of the poor pre-empt any
potential attempt to set up a
special
interest group for the
poor.
The
moral of the story is therefore, that a
country may have democracy,
may have regular elections
and yet
may
continue to deprive the majority of authentic
participation in the legislatures, or
even in interest
groups.
There
are also instances where
political parties and
movements set up ostensibly
and specifically by the
poor
for
the poor, end up as partners of the
rich and distort the
articulation of the interests of the
poor.
Legislatures
are virtually always at the
mercy of the majorities. Governments tend to enjoy an
unfair
advantage
over the opposition in setting the
legislative agenda. When oppositions
have the numerical
strength
to requisition sessions at their
own initiative, they remain
subject to the overt and covert influence
of
the
government in determining the work of the
legislatures.
Interest
groups that seek legislative
intervention have to strike a fine
balance in their approach in
order that
they
are able to provide the
opposition with fresh
ammunition to fire upon the government
while at the same
time
ensuring that they do not
antagonize the government by too close an
alignment with the opposition.
Interest
groups should be very good at walking the
thin line of hyper-sensitivity that
marks the partisan
aspect
of
legislatures.
Legislative
majorities and other members of
legislatures have a fair number of
priorities competing for
their
attention,
ahead of interest groups.
Constituency considerations, petitions
for jobs, transfers and
favours,
their
own pre-occupations with government,
party matters, attendance of House
sittings, House committee
meetings,
social engagements et
al.
Interest
groups use a range of
methods to capture the attention of
legislators. Letters and
documents in the
mail,
telephone calls, interviews for personal
briefings, delegations to the premises of
Parliament to button-
hole
members, meetings with Ministers,
publication of appeals, protests,
letters in the Press to invite
the
attention
of leaders, holding of seminars,
Press conferences, requests to be
heard by Parliamentary
committees
to enable presentation of viewpoints.
There
is a tendency in most interest
groups to concentrate only on
specific policy measures
such as taxes,
duties,
etc. rather than on conceptual
and fundamental issues that
may require entirely new legislation
or
substantive
amendments to existing legislation. There are
honorable exceptions such as when
interest groups
take
up critical causes like women's rights,
children's rights.
In
general, interest groups are
"reactive" rather than anticipatory and pre-emptive,
going into action as soon
as
their interests are
threatened or affected by a legislative
or executive decision. Legislatures enjoy
certain
inherent
advantages over interest
groups in terms of infrastructure,
resources and the panoply of
privileges.
Yet
certain interest groups can
also deploy vast resources
to achieve their aims, particularly in a
covert
manner.
Where lobbies have access to
unreported income or where they
are able to offer
legislators facilities
and
electoral support, then members of
legislatures become vulnerable to undue influence.
When legislators
and
interest groups converge and
collaborate there can be an inhibiting
and inimical impact on
democracy
because
those adversely affected by
such a combination have no
recourse, except to the
courts.
Reporting
of Parliament is a complex and
challenging task for media
correspondents. It demands
knowledge,
understanding
and vigilance of the highest level.
Reporting on the activities and
aims of interest groups
and
monitoring
their open as well as unseen
interaction with the legislative
sector requires an
additional
investment
of time, talent and investigative resources. To
enable correspondents to do justice to
these
considerable
demands, media need to significantly
increase the quality and quantum of the
support that they
provide
to correspondents.
42
Globalization
of Media MCM404
VU
In
principle, interest groups
have a positive and corrective
role to play in relation to the
legislative process
provided
that the media are able to
accurately and effectively
report on this relationship and keep the
people
well-informed
with in-depth
analyses.
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