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Describing Risk:Unequal Probability Outcomes

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Microeconomics ­ECO402
VU
Lesson 13
Introduction
Choice with certainty is reasonably straightforward.
How do we choose when certain variables such as income and prices are uncertain (i.e.
making choices with risk)?
Describing Risk
To measure risk we must know:
1) All of the possible outcomes.
2) The likelihood that each outcome will occur (its probability).
Interpreting Probability
­ The likelihood that a given outcome will occur
­ Objective Interpretation
· Based on the observed frequency of past events
­ Subjective
· Based on perception or experience with or without an observed frequency
­  Different information or different abilities to process the same information can
influence the subjective probability
Expected Value
­ The weighted average of the payoffs or values resulting from all possible outcomes.
· The probabilities of each outcome are used as weights
· Expected value measures the central tendency; the payoff or value expected on
average
­ An Example
· Investment in drilling exploration:
· Two outcomes are possible
­  Success -- the stock price increase from $30 to $40/share
­  Failure -- the stock price falls from $30 to $20/share
· Objective Probability
­  100 explorations, 25 successes and 75 failures
­  Probability (Pr) of success = 1/4 and the probability of failure = 3/4
EV = Pr(success)($40/share) + Pr(failure)($20/share)
=
1 4 ($ 4 0 /s h a re ) + 3 4 ($ 2 0 /s h a re )
EV
E V = $ 2 5 /s h a re
Given:
­ Two possible outcomes having payoffs X1 and X2
­ Probabilities of each outcome is given by Pr1 & Pr2
Generally, expected value is written as:
E(X) = Pr1X1 + Pr2X2 +... + Prn Xn
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Microeconomics ­ECO402
VU
Variability
­ The extent to which possible outcomes of an uncertain event may differ
Variability: A Scenario
­ Suppose you are choosing between two part-time sales jobs that have the same
expected income ($1,500)
­ The first job is based entirely on commission.
­ The second is a salaried position.
­ There are two equally likely outcomes in the first job--$2,000 for a good sales job and
$1,000 for a modestly successful one.
­ The second pays $1,510 most of the time (.99 probability), but you will earn $510 if the
company goes out of business (.01 probability).
Income from Sales Jobs
Outcome 1
Outcome 2
Probability
Income($)
probability
Income($)
Expected
income
.5
2000
.5
1000
1500
Job 1: Commission
.99
1510
.01
510
1500
Job 2: Fixed salary
E(X1 ) = .5($2000) + .5($1000) = $1500
Job 2 Expected Income
E(X  2 ) = .99($1510) + .01($510) = $1500
While the expected values are the same, the variability is not.
Greater variability from expected values signals greater risk.
Deviation
­ Difference between expected payoff and actual payoff
Deviations from Expected Income ($)
Outcome 1
Deviation
Outcome 2
Deviation
Job 1
$2,000
$500
$1,000
-$500
Job 2
1,510
10
510
-900
­  Adjusting for negative numbers
­  The standard deviation measures the square root of the average of the squares of the
deviations of the payoffs associated with each outcome from their expected value.
­
The standard deviation is written:
σ = Pr[X1 -E(X)2]  +Pr [X2 -E(X)2]
1
2
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Microeconomics ­ECO402
VU
Calculating Variance ($)
Deviation
Deviation
Deviation
Standard
Outcome 1
Squared
Outcome 2
Squared  Squared
Deviation
Job 1 $2,000
$250,000
$1,000
$250,000
$250,000
$500.00
Job 2 1,510
100
510
980,100
9,900
99.50
The standard deviations of the two jobs are:
σ1 =
0) + .5($250,00
.5($250,00
0
σ 1 =  $ 250 , 000
σ 1 = 500  *Greater Risk
σ
=
+ .01($980,1
.99($100
00)
2
σ
=
$ 9 , 900
2
σ
= 99 . 50
2
The standard deviation can be used when there are many outcomes instead of only two.
An Example
­ Job 1 is a job in which the income ranges from $1000 to $2000 in increments of $100
that are all equally likely.
­ Job 2 is a job in which the income ranges from $1300 to $1700 in increments of $100
that, also, are all equally likely.
Probability
Job 1 has greater
spread: greater
standard deviation
and greater risk
than Job 2.
0.2
Job 2
0.1
Job 1
Income
$1000
$1500
$2000
Outcome Probabilities of Two Jobs (unequal probability of outcomes)
­ Job 1: greater spread & standard deviation
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Microeconomics ­ECO402
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­ Peaked distribution: extreme payoffs are less likely
Decision Making
­ A risk avoider would choose Job 2: same expected income as Job 1 with less risk.
­ Suppose we add $100 to each payoff in Job 1 which makes the expected payoff =
$1600.
Unequal Probability Outcomes
The distribution of payoffs
Probability
associated with Job 1 has a
greater spread and standard
deviation than those with Job 2.
0.2
Job 2
0.1
Job 1
Income
$1000
$1500
$2000
Income from Sales Jobs--Modified ($)
Deviation
Deviation
Deviation Standard
Outcome 1
Squared
Outcome 2
Squared
Squared  Deviation
Job 1  $2,100
$250,000
$1,100
$250,000
$1, 600
$500
Job 2  1510
100
510
980,100
1, 500
99.50
Recall: The standard deviation is the square root of the deviation squared.
Decision making
­ Job 1: expected income $1,600 and a standard deviation of $500.
­ Job 2: expected income of $1,500 and a standard deviation of $99.50
­ Which job?
·  Greater value or less risk?
Example
­ Suppose a city wants to deter people from wrong parking.
­ The alternatives ......
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Microeconomics ­ECO402
VU
Assumptions:
1) Wrong parking saves a person $5 in terms of time spent searching for a parking space.
2) The driver is risk neutral.
3) Cost of apprehension is zero.
A fine of $5.01 would deter the driver from double parking.
­ Benefit of wrong parking ($5) is less than the cost ($5.01) equals a net benefit that is
less than 0.
Increasing the fine can reduce enforcement cost:
­ A $50 fine with a .1 probability of being caught results in an expected penalty of $5.
­ A $500 fine with a .01 probability of being caught results in an expected penalty of $5.
The more risk averse drivers are, the lower the fine needs to be in order to be effective.
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Table of Contents:
  1. ECONOMICS:Themes of Microeconomics, Theories and Models
  2. Economics: Another Perspective, Factors of Production
  3. REAL VERSUS NOMINAL PRICES:SUPPLY AND DEMAND, The Demand Curve
  4. Changes in Market Equilibrium:Market for College Education
  5. Elasticities of supply and demand:The Demand for Gasoline
  6. Consumer Behavior:Consumer Preferences, Indifference curves
  7. CONSUMER PREFERENCES:Budget Constraints, Consumer Choice
  8. Note it is repeated:Consumer Preferences, Revealed Preferences
  9. MARGINAL UTILITY AND CONSUMER CHOICE:COST-OF-LIVING INDEXES
  10. Review of Consumer Equilibrium:INDIVIDUAL DEMAND, An Inferior Good
  11. Income & Substitution Effects:Determining the Market Demand Curve
  12. The Aggregate Demand For Wheat:NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
  13. Describing Risk:Unequal Probability Outcomes
  14. PREFERENCES TOWARD RISK:Risk Premium, Indifference Curve
  15. PREFERENCES TOWARD RISK:Reducing Risk, The Demand for Risky Assets
  16. The Technology of Production:Production Function for Food
  17. Production with Two Variable Inputs:Returns to Scale
  18. Measuring Cost: Which Costs Matter?:Cost in the Short Run
  19. A Firm’s Short-Run Costs ($):The Effect of Effluent Fees on Firms’ Input Choices
  20. Cost in the Long Run:Long-Run Cost with Economies & Diseconomies of Scale
  21. Production with Two Outputs--Economies of Scope:Cubic Cost Function
  22. Perfectly Competitive Markets:Choosing Output in Short Run
  23. A Competitive Firm Incurring Losses:Industry Supply in Short Run
  24. Elasticity of Market Supply:Producer Surplus for a Market
  25. Elasticity of Market Supply:Long-Run Competitive Equilibrium
  26. Elasticity of Market Supply:The Industry’s Long-Run Supply Curve
  27. Elasticity of Market Supply:Welfare loss if price is held below market-clearing level
  28. Price Supports:Supply Restrictions, Import Quotas and Tariffs
  29. The Sugar Quota:The Impact of a Tax or Subsidy, Subsidy
  30. Perfect Competition:Total, Marginal, and Average Revenue
  31. Perfect Competition:Effect of Excise Tax on Monopolist
  32. Monopoly:Elasticity of Demand and Price Markup, Sources of Monopoly Power
  33. The Social Costs of Monopoly Power:Price Regulation, Monopsony
  34. Monopsony Power:Pricing With Market Power, Capturing Consumer Surplus
  35. Monopsony Power:THE ECONOMICS OF COUPONS AND REBATES
  36. Airline Fares:Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel, The Two-Part Tariff
  37. Bundling:Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled
  38. Bundling:Mixed Versus Pure Bundling, Effects of Advertising
  39. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION:Monopolistic Competition in the Market for Colas and Coffee
  40. OLIGOPOLY:Duopoly Example, Price Competition
  41. Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma, Implications of the Prisoners
  42. COMPETITIVE FACTOR MARKETS:Marginal Revenue Product
  43. Competitive Factor Markets:The Demand for Jet Fuel
  44. Equilibrium in a Competitive Factor Market:Labor Market Equilibrium
  45. Factor Markets with Monopoly Power:Monopoly Power of Sellers of Labor