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![]() Management
of Financial Institutions - MGT
604
VU
Lecture
# 43
The
Collapse of ENRON
Only
months before Enron
Corporations bankruptcy filing in
December 2001, the firm
was
widely
regarded as one of the most
innovative, fastest growing, and best
managed
businesses
in the United States. With
the swift collapse,
shareholders, including
thousands
of
Enron workers who held
company stock in their
401(k) retirement accounts,
lost tens of
billions
of dollars. Investigations of wrongdoing
may take years to conclude, but
Enron's
failure
already raises financial
oversight issues with wider
applications. This lecture
briefly
examines
the accounting system that
failed to provide a clear
picture of the firm's
true
condition,
the independent auditors and board
members who were unwilling to
challenge
Enron's
management, the Wall Street
stock analysts and bond raters
who missed the
trouble
ahead,
the rules governing employer
stock in company pension
plans, and the
unregulated
energy
derivatives trading that was
the core of Enron's business. Formed in
1985 from a
merger
of Houston Natural Gas and
Inter-north, Enron Corporation was
the first nationwide
natural
gas pipeline network. Over
time, the firm's business
focus shifted from the
regulated
transportation
of natural gas to unregulated
energy trading markets. The
guiding principle
seems
to have been that there was
more money to be made in
buying and selling
financial
contracts
linked to the value of
energy assets (and to other
economic variables) than
in
actual
ownership of physical assets.
Until late 2001, nearly
all observers including
professional
Wall Street analysts regarded
this transformation as an outstanding
success.
Enron's
reported annual revenues
grew from under $10 billion
in the early 1990s to
$101
billion
in 2000, ranking it seventh on
the Fortune 500. Several
committees in the House
and
Senate
have held or plan to hold
hearings related to Enron's
fall. The Justice Department
is
conducting
a criminal investigation. The
challenge for financial
oversight, however,
does
not
depend on findings of wrongdoing.
Even if no one at Enron did
anything improper,
the
swift
and unanticipated collapse of such a
large corporation suggests
basic problems with
the
U.S. system of securities
regulation, which is based on
the full and accurate disclosure
of
all financial information
that market participants
need to make informed
investment
decisions.
Auditing
Issues
Federal
securities law requires that
the accounting statements of publicly
traded
corporations
be certified by an independent auditor.
Enron's outside audits have
received
much
attention. While external
audits do not prevent
corporations from making
financial
mistakes,
let alone bankruptcy,
problems with recent Enron
audits may have contributed
to
both
the rapid rise and the sharp
fall in its stock price.
Outside investors, including
financial
institutions
may have been misled
about the corporation's net
income (which was
subsequently
restated) and contingent liabilities
(which were far larger
than generally
known).
The auditor, Arthur
Andersen, has admitted some
mistakes. Andersen fired
the
partner
in charge of Enron audits on January
15, 2002, and Enron
dismissed Andersen on
January
17. One issue is whether
Andersen's extensive consulting
work for Enron may
have
compromised
its judgment in determining
the nature, timing, and
extent of audit procedures
and
in asking that revisions be
made to financial statements, which
are the responsibility
of
Enron's
management. Questions have also
been asked about Andersen
destroying
documents
and e-mails related to its
audits. Oversight of auditors
has primarily rested
with
the
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (a nongovernmental
trade group) and
state
boards of accountancy. On January
17, 2002, the Chairman of
the Securities and
Exchange
Commission (SEC) proposed a
new oversight board that
would be responsible
for
disciplinary
actions.
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of Financial Institutions - MGT
604
VU
Accounting
Issues
The
Enron controversy involves
several accounting issues.
One concerns the
rules
governing
whether the financial statements of
special purpose entities (SPEs) established
by
a
corporation should be consolidated
with the corporation's
financial statements; for
certain
SPE
partnerships at issue, consolidation is
not required if among other
things an
independent
third party invests as
little as 3% of the capital, a
threshold some consider
too
low.
A second issue concerns the
latitude allowed in valuing
derivatives, particularly
non-
exchange
traded energy contracts. Third,
there are calls for
improved disclosure, either
in
notes
to financial statements or a management discussion and
analysis, especially
for
financial
arrangements involving contingent
liabilities. Accounting standards
for
corporations
are set by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, a
nongovernmental
entity,
though there are also SEC
requirements. (The SEC has
statutory authority to
set
accounting
standards for firms that
sell securities to the
public.)
Pension
Issues
Like
many companies, Enron sponsors a
retirement plan a "401(k)"
for its employees to
which
they can contribute a portion of
their pay on a tax-deferred
basis. As of December 31,
2000,
62% of the assets held in
the corporation's 401(k)
retirement plan consisted of
Enron
stock.
Many individual Enron
employees held even larger
percentages of Enron stock
in
their
401(k) accounts. Shares of
Enron, which in January 2001 traded
for more than
$80/share,
were worth less than 70
cents in January 2002. Consequently,
the company's
bankruptcy
has substantially reduced the
value of its employees'
retirement accounts.
The
losses
suffered by participants in the
Enron Corporation's 401(k)
plan have prompted
questions
about the laws and
regulations that govern
these plans.
Corporate
Governance Issues
The
role of a company's board of directors is
to oversee corporate management to
protect
the
interests of shareholders. However, in
1999 Enron's board waived conflict of
interest
rules
to allow chief financial
officer Andrew Fastow to
create private partnerships to
do
business
with the firm. These
partnerships appear to have concealed
debts and liabilities
that
would
have had a significant impact on
Enron's reported profits.
Enron's collapse raises
the
issue
of how to reinforce directors'
capability and will to challenge
questionable dealings by
corporate
managers. Specific questions involve
independent or "outside" directors.
(Stock
exchange
rules require that a certain
percentage of board members be unaffiliated
with the
firm
and its management.)
Securities
Analyst Issues
Securities
analysts employed by investment banks
provide research and make "buy,"
"sell,"
or
"hold" recommendations for
the use of their sales
staffs and their investor
clients. These
recommendations
are widely circulated and
are relied upon by many
investors throughout
the
markets. Analyst support was
crucial to Enron because it
required constant infusions
of
funding
from the financial markets.
On November 29, 2001, after
Enron's stock had
fallen
99%
from its high, and after
rating agencies had downgraded
its debt to "junk bond"
status,
only
two of 11 major firm
analysts rated its stock a
"sell." This performance
added to
concerns
that were raised in 2000 in
the wake of the "dot
com" stock crash.
Derivatives
Issues
The
core of Enron's business appears to
have been dealing in
derivative contracts based
on
the
prices of oil, gas, electricity and
other variables. For
example, Enron sold
long-term
contracts
to sell energy at fixed prices. These
contracts allow the buyers
to avoid, or hedge,
the
risks that increases (or
drops) in energy prices posed to
their businesses. Since
the
markets
in which Enron traded are
largely unregulated, with no
reporting requirements,
little
information is available about
the extent or profitability of
Enron's derivatives
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of Financial Institutions - MGT
604
VU
activities.
Did Enron earn money from
dealer commissions and spreads, or was it
actively
speculating
on future price trends? Speculative
losses in derivatives, perhaps
masked by
"creative"
accounting, could have
contributed to the firm's
downfall. On the other hand,
the
trading
operations may have been
profitable and trouble free, and
Enron's financial
difficulties
the result of other
unrelated operations. Enron's
collapse raises the issue
of
supervision
of unregulated derivatives
markets.
Corrective
Actions
The
collapse of Enron proved to be a
valuable wake-up call to a
number of affected
groups.
The
following actions have
already been taken by
private organizations: The
Business
Roundtable,
composed of the chief
executives of about 150 large
firms, urged
corporations
to
adopt a number of voluntary changes in
corporate governance rules,
including that a
``substantial
majority'' of corporate boards be
independent ``both in fact and
appearance.''
The
New York Stock Exchange and
the National Association of
Securities Dealers
approved
major additions and changes in
the rules for accounting,
auditing, and corporate
governance
as necessary conditions for
listing of a corporation's stock
for trade on the
exchange.
The major continuing
uncertainty is how the exchanges will
monitor and enforce
these
rules. The International
Corporate Governance Network,
institutional investors
that
control
about $10 trillion in assets,
has approved a set of
international standards
for
corporate
governance that its members
would use their voting
power to promote. Standard
and
Poor's, one of the three
major credit-rating agencies,
has developed a new concept
of
``core
earnings'' as a measure of earnings
from a company's primary
lines of business.
Compared
with earnings as defined by
the generally accepted
accounting principles
(GAAP),
for example, the S&P
measure will exclude gains and losses
from a variety of
financial
transactions. S&P plans to report
this measure of earnings for
all publicly held
U.S.
companies.
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